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The accord signed at United Nations headquarters on Sept. 25 between the government of President
Alfredo Cristiani and the rebels of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has, in
the words of observers, "untied the Gordian knot" in the Salvadoran peace process. At the close of
10 days of intense discussion, signatories declared that the 11- page document, known as the New
York Agreement, gives a "decisive impetus to the negotiations" that began two years ago. The peace
talks, after making substantial progress last spring (see "Transition in El Salvador - Light at the
End of the Tunnel?," CAU 08/21/91), had ground to a halt by late July, as the two sides could find
no points of coincidence or compromise over the most controversial issues the armed forces and a
cease-fire. The impasse was overcome when UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar took the
unprecedented step of bringing the two sides into direct negotiations at UN headquarters. During
the closed door sessions, Perez de Cuellar presented, in separate meetings with each delegation,
the proposed accord drafted by his personal representative, Alvaro de Soto, who has been acting as
mediator in the talks. The New York document includes eight basic points, including the creation
of a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ); agreement to purge, reduce
and re-educate the government army; the creation of a new National Police force; and several
agreements on social welfare and economic policies. These agreements are to be implemented in
accordance with a calendar which sets Dec. 15 as the deadline for signing a cease-fire. However,
the New York Agreement left unresolved several critical issues which still stand in the way of a
definitive resolution of the conflict, in particular, concrete terms for military reforms and a ceasefire. Resolution of the two issues, which observers say are inseparable and must be defined in
tandem, is now the key to a definitive settlement. Despite the unparalleled optimism generated
by the accord, Salvadoran delegates said it should not be seen as a final settlement but as "the
basis for reaching, in the short term, a set of political agreements required for bringing to an end
to the armed conflict in our country." The difficulty of reaching agreement on the unresolved
issues became clear on Oct. 15 when the two sides met again in Mexico to resume negotiations, and
particularly to hammer out cease-fire terms. After one week of intensive, closed-door bargaining,
and a concrete proposal presented by UN mediator De Soto, the rebel and government delegations
were able to make some headway in discussing cease-fire terms, but left Mexico with much to be
resolved, and a long way from a final accord. Demilitarization and cease-fire: still the core issues
In signing the UN accord, the FMLN made an important concession by dropping the demand
for integration of rebel forces into the government army. The government agreed to a "purge,
reduction and re-education" of the 60,000-strong army. The government delegation was able to defer
discussion on concrete terms and procedural arrangements for achieving these military reforms.
In the end, it was agreed that an "ad hoc" commission will be created to examine the issue, and
details would be negotiated in subsequent talks. The accord specifies that FMLN combatants are
to be included in a new civilian-controlled National Police force. The National Police will replace
three military-run bodies: Treasury Police, National Guard (a militarized police force) and Public
Security Force (CUSEP). The three forces are notorious for human rights abuses and corruption,
particularly the Treasury Police, which is considered a principal actor in much of the death squad
activity over the past 15 years. Reorganization of the Salvadoran police forces, which number nearly
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20,000, is an important step. However, more critical, and still pending, is restructuring of the army,
led by an officer corps whose influence extends throughout all areas of Salvadoran society. The
army's high command is also believed to play a major role in widespread human rights abuses. The
FMLN is unlikely to demobilize until rebels are satisfied that military reforms and international
safeguards are sufficient to ensure the security of combatants, supporters and allies; an end to
military impunity; and, a strictly neutral and apolitical role for the military in society. FMLN general
command member Joaquin Villalobos said, "Politically, it is practically impossible to trust the
army and to believe that purges and reduced troop strength will be sufficient transformation of
the armed forces." He added that a change in the nature of the armed forces is mandatory. In this
regard, an effective reeducation of the army is considered crucial. The Salvadoran armed forces
currently operate on the basis of the "National Security Doctrine," which defines the army's role as
maintaining "internal security" by combatting "subversion" within society (i.e., domestic challenges
to the status quo). During the 1960s and 1970s, US foreign policy and military advisers imposed
this doctrine on Latin American military organizations. The FMLN, along with much of the Latin
American left, has insisted that the army's sole legitimate function should be defense of national
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The New York Agreement refers to this doctrinal reorientation,
within the framework of respect for "principles based on the rule of law, the primacy of the dignity
of the human being and respect for his/her rights." The lessons of Haiti The FMLN is perhaps
the most formidable insurgency in Latin American history. At present, rebel full- and part-time
combatants number 17,000, and active collaborators are estimated at about 100,000. The FMLN
exercises control or determining influence over a third to half of Salvadoran territory. Several
years ago the FMLN abandoned its strategic objective of seizing power through military means.
(On the FMLN's ideological evolution, see "The Transformation of the FMLN," CAU, 08/23/91.)
The organization now perceives itself as protagonist in a process of thorough demilitarization
and political, social and economic democratization of Salvadoran society. The FMLN's objective
is to become a legal, political organization advocating change through civic struggle and electoral
participation. However, FMLN leaders insist that before it can demobilize, guarantees must be in
place for its own security and for the freedom to operate as a political movement in civil society. In
New York, FMLN negotiating team member Roberto Canas said, "The factors which would allow
for political participation and pluralism have been obstructed by the war, and could be developed
once a cease-fire is achieved. Therefore, we are negotiating not only guarantees for the FMLN,
but guarantees that fundamental change will take place in the country." Some observers have
pointed to the recent coup in Haiti by a military organization that did not undergo restructuring
and reform, despite a political democratization process leading to free elections. In Colombia, over
2,000 members of the Patriotic Union (UP) party have been assassinated by rightist paramilitary
groups after former guerrillas disarmed and became active in civilian politics. Observers say
the Haitian and Colombian experiences vindicate FMLN insistence on prior military reform and
guarantees from the international community on the integrity of peace agreements and the security
of former rebel combatants. In Villalobos' words, the FMLN "cannot jump into the swimming
pool without assurances that there will be sufficient water and an adequate temperature for us to
swim." "Sufficient water and adequate temperature" refers to two considerations on the minds of
FMLN leaders. One is the immediate issue of the physical safety of FMLN members and supporters.
The other is achieving sufficient demilitarization and civilian control over society before the end
of the war to allow political protagonists to struggle for real change in Salvadoran society. These
are the considerations behind the FMLN's proposal presented in New York and Mexico for a oneyear transition period truce. During the "informal cease-fire," negotiators would work toward
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definition and implementation of a comprehensive settlement. (See CAU 10/18/91.) A possible
scenario then, is a cease-fire agreement in which rebel combatants do not immediately demobilize
(the FMLN's so-called "transitional period of armed peace"). UN forces would play a pivotal role
for an extended period in this scenario. In August, the first civilian, police, and military teams
from the United Nations El Salvador Group (ONUSAL), created last May by Security Council
mandate, arrived in El Salvador. In this first stage, the 115-member ONUSAL mission was split
up into several small units to monitor respect for human rights and investigate complaints in
several locations. Subsequent stages, contingent on conclusion of a cease-fire accord, will see an
increase in ONUSAL mission numbers and activities, including peacekeeping, verification of a
comprehensive settlement, and assistance in rebel demobilization and reintegration into civilian
society. The COPAZ is also expected to expedite the transition to peace. On Oct. 10 in Mexico City,
rebel and government delegations reached agreement on COPAZ membership. Two Commission
members represent the government, and another two, the FMLN. Next, all political parties or
coalitions holding seats in the national legislature are to have one representative apiece. COPAZ
is charged with supervision and verification of a comprehensive settlement. The Commission
will have direct access to the president and powers to submit draft legislation related to the peace
process. The UN Security Council is expected to approve a resolution in the near future endorsing
the Commission and authorizing it to appeal directly to the United Nations. Socio-economic policy
measures and extreme-right opposition In the New York accord, the government committed itself
to provide agricultural workers and small farmers with access to land it currently owns, as well as
to "excess" land currently controlled by private landowners. The Salvadoran constitution specifies
a ceiling of 245 ha. on individual landholdings. The government also agreed to "respect the current
state of land tenure within conflict zones" while claims on these holdings are being decided. The
conflict in El Salvador is historically rooted in one of the most extreme and unequal land tenure
systems in Latin America. The government's commitments in the New York accord constitute the
first steps in an authentic agrarian reform. If implemented, such reforms would mean that a third
to a half of national territory will be controlled by Salvadorans characterized as the rebels' active
social base. Consequently, socio-economic agreements are bound to exacerbate divisions within the
Salvadoran elite. A few hours after the New York accord was reached, the far right represented by
factions within the armed forces and the governing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) party
publicized its opposition. In San Salvador, Vice President Francisco Merino Lopez, for instance,
asserted that despite the accords, the government would "never" accept FMLN participation in
the National Police. In addition, an escalation of rightist threats and violence was reported in El
Salvador during and after the New York talks (see CAU, 09/27/91). ARENA is currently divided
between the extreme right and moderate, pragmatic factions. The former is led by ret. colonel
Sigfredo Ochoa and Vice President Merino Lopez, and supported by hard-line military officers and
representatives of the old oligarchy. The latter is headed by President Cristiani, San Salvador Mayor
Armando Calderon Sol, and Legislative Assembly president Roberto Angulo, and supported by
more forward-looking "new right" businesspersons organized in the National Association of Private
Enterprise (ANEP) and the Salvadoran Development Foundation (FUSADES). Roberto d'Abuisson,
ARENA party founder and leader, was recently diagnosed with terminal cancer. Report of the
diagnosis has triggered a fierce internal struggle for succession in the ruling party. The outcome
of this struggle will be critical for the prospects of the peace process. Decisive international role
Although checkered by a innumerable setbacks and advances, and carried out against the backdrop
of ongoing military conflict inside the country, the Salvadoran peace process has, in retrospect,
made dramatic advances over the past two years. Since the initial September 1989 encounter,
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the two sides have met 18 times in Geneva, Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and New York. The
process reached a high point last spring with the signing of the first accords of substance pertaining
to human rights and constitutional reforms. The high priority placed by Perez de Cuellar on the
New York talks underscored the remarkable role played by the international community. In fact,
cumulative pressures applied by the international community were decisive in bringing the two
sides together in New York at a time when the negotiations were perceived as stalemated, and a
major escalation in the war was predicted. At the last US-Soviet summit, the UN Secretary General
was requested to take an active role in overcoming the impasse. Similar calls were put forward by
the "Friends of the Salvadoran Peace Process" group comprised of the Spanish, Mexican, Colombian
and Venezuelan governments , and Ibero- American heads of state who met in Guadalajara, Mexico
in late July. In addition, the UN Secretariat General, as the organization's administrative executive,
has additional reasons for seeing a successful conclusion to the peace process by year-end. Perez
de Cuellar's term as Secretary General ends in January 1992, as does that of his personal staff,
including Alvaro de Soto. According to UN procedures, any unfinished business of the Secretariat
General will be transferred to the Security Council in January "in order to guarantee fulfillment of
its resolutions." One of the Security Council's options would be to send an emergency peacekeeping
force to El Salvador. Another would be to pass the Salvadoran mediation mandate on to the new
Secretary General. Salvadoran observers predict that either scenario could complicate the peace
process, in the event that agreements on a cease-fire and comprehensive settlement have not yet
been concluded.

-- End --
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